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Serbia and the Stability Pact:
What comes after the Thessaloniki meeting?
Miroljub Labus
After the Stability Pact Second Regional Table, held in Thessaloniki in June, the united Serbian opposi-
tion somehow surprised the participants by submitting a proposal to organize a funding conference for the
reconstruction of post-Milosevic Serbia. The first political and diplomatic reaction was both positive and
encouraging. The messages were also very clear. The commitment of the opposition parties to pursue the
struggle for changing the regime through elections and to become as united as possible was welcomed. The
question of the Serbian Renewal Movement’s absence was raised, but that missing signature, contrary to pre-
vious cases, did not condition the initiative. Signatories of the proposal are expected to produce a short and
clear political document so as to state precisely their electoral demands and set out the position of a future
government towards Europe. Their position in the submitted proposal is interpreted as an important part of
that platform.
With this project the Serbian opposition stands both to gain and lose a lot. If the project is success-
fully accomplished, it will dramatically increase confidence in the opposition’s ability to govern the
country in the future and to carry out the necessary reforms. Undecided voters would react positively.
a) G17 estimate based on official information from the Federal Statistics Office
b) The rate of unemployment for IV 2000 is 27.41% in Serbia, 40.16% in Montenegro, & 28.36% in FRY.
FRY Basic Economic Indicators 1999. 1999. V 2000 V 2000 V 2000 I-V 2000
1998. IV 2000 V 1999 I-V 1999
GDP - USD million 14,224a) -19.3% É É É É
Montenegro É É É É É É
Serbia É É É É É É
GDP per capita - USD 1,699a) -19.1% É É É É
Montenegro É É É É É É
Serbia É É É É É É
Central Serbia É É É É É É
Vojvodina É É É É É É
Industrial Production É -24.1% É 3.2% 96.2% 14.9%
Montenegro É -7.6% É -15.5% 4.6% -0.6%
Serbia É -25.6% É 4.3% 106.8% 16.4%
Central Serbia É -24.5% É 2.3% 101.8% 19.5%
Vojvodina É -28.2% É 9.1% 118.8% 9.6%
Average Wage - DM 107 -31.7% É É É É
Montenegro 154 -14.1% É É É É
Serbia 102 -33.8% 89 1.0% -0.3% -30.5%
Unemployment Rateb) 27.3% 8.3% É É É É
Montenegro 36.8% 7.9% É É É É
Serbia 26.5% 8.2% É É É É
Export - USD million 1,498 -46.9% 131.4 -0.9% 53.7% 2.5%
Montenegro 123 -4.7% 6.3 -50.2% -31.7% 36.1%
Serbia 1,375 -48.9% 125.1 4.3% 64.0% -0.3%
Import - USD million 3,296 -30.3% 266.9 -22.1% 99.9% 30.0%
Montenegro 358 6.9% 19.1 -46.6% -27.9% -14.0%
Serbia 2,938 -33.2% 247.9 -19.2% 131.5% 37.1%
Monetary supply (M1), end of period, DIN billion 16.4 51.9% 18.7 5.0% 47.6% 49.7%
Cash 6.7 34.0% 5.7 -10.5% 14.5% 23.6%
Deposits 9.7 67.2% 13.0 13.7% 69.2% 68.5%
Real money supply, end of period, DM million 739 -42.3% 686 3.0% -39.8% -42.3%
Market exchange rate, monthly level 4.25% -38.8% 5.43% 6.1% 146.8% -2.6%
Retail prices É 42.4% É 5.2% 61.5% 55.9%
Montenegro É 60.1% É 11.6% 151.5% 135.7%
Serbia É 41.1% É 4.5% 55.8% 50.4%
Cost of living É 44.9% É 5.7% 70.2% 64.5%
Montenegro É 67.2% É 10.0% 159.0% 147.9%
Serbia É 43.5% É 5.5% 64.0% 57.2%
Industrial prices É 44.2% É 5.3% 102.2% 84.3%
Montenegro É 63.7% É 11.2% 153.2% 139.6%
Serbia É 43.2% É 4.8% 98.4% 80.8%
Black market exchange rate (din/DM) 12.6 88.1% 22.7 -1.4% 113.4% 130.3%
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Potential 
rivalry needs 
to be avoided
They believe that changes must come, but are not convinced in the opposition’s ability to bring them about.
In recent public opinion polls 70% of respondents favored changes. However, that percentage scales down
to around 50% when asked whether they are for changes which will result in larger inequalities in income
distribution. If the question is reformulated and changes are linked with greater opportunities for increased
wages, but also with a certain increase in the risk of unemployment, the commitment for changes registers
at around 40%. 
This is still not the majority of the electorate, whose support is crucial for the transition of the economy
and society. The donors’ conference would have a substantial influence in revising this attitude, as it would
reduce the risk in inevitable changes. In addition, it presumes the lifting of all sanctions immediately after a
new democratic government is formed in Serbia, which also would lessen the non-commercial investment
risk. The total impact on public opinion in Serbia would be more than positive.
As it appears now, the opposition will go to the next local and federal elections with two separate lists.
Nobody believes that the Serbian Renewal Movement will abstain from the elections, despite its statements.
Two lists for the local elections impair the opposition’s prospects for remaining in power in the towns that it
governs now. Thus we can understand that both the civil society in Serbia and the international community
hope to see only one list - that of the united opposition. In addition, this would turn the local and federal
elections into a referendum on the current regime, with great prospects that such a referendum might bring
about democratic changes.
Yet, all previous requests of the international community and the civil society in Serbia for a single elec-
toral list have failed. Such a policy has de facto given the right of veto to one political party and the possi-
bility for countless inter-party negotiations.  It has created an impression of the policy of endless waiting and
futile discussions affecting the opposition’s prospects to win the elections. Because of that, all opposition par-
ties, with the exception of the Serbian Renewal Movement, have decided to begin with preparations for elec-
tions - leaving the doors open for the SPO to join them at any time. A serious debate on the proposal for the
donors’ conference for post-Milosevic Serbia would be a clear signal of the international community to the
opposition parties and voters in Serbia: The international community wants to see a greater unity of demo-
cratic forces in Serbia and is willing to assist the citizens in the economic reconstruction. Thereby it would
convey a positive message that a Serbia which shares the same values and ideals as other European coun-
tries has its place in the community of European states. 
It was stated in Thessaloniki that the ministries of finance of member countries would have great reser-
vations with respect to securing the funds before Serbia became a full-fledged member of the Stability Pact.
Therefore, further bilateral talks were suggested, wherein all details of the proposal would be discussed.
G17 PLUS prepared the proposal technically, though it was formally submitted by the united Serbian
opposition. It was an important new moment in the development of relations between opposition parties and
civil society sectors. Before that, opposition parties were willing to cooperate only with the students’ move-
ment "Otpor" (Resistance), while cooperation with other organizations was always subject to veto by some
opposition party. The change of relations between the SPO and other opposition parties has removed that
impediment for cooperation.
Nevertheless, the initiative’s fate should not be dependent on anybody’s individual position. Experience
is in favor of this solution. The Alliance for Change had good initiatives at the end of the last year, but due
to disputes over the tactics of political struggle against the regime, it was impossible to draw a joint pro-
posal on future economic cooperation between Serbia and the world. That issue has been temporarily aban-
doned and so has the whole body of cooperation. The proposal for the funding conference for the recon-
struction of post-Milosevic Serbia revives this idea. What should be avoided now is a potential rivalry
between the opposition and non-governmental sector. We believe that past experience will prevent us from
making the same mistake this time.
The proposal to organize a funding conference for the reconstruction of post-Milosevic Serbia does not
relate to all three working tables, but to Working Table II exclusively. This is a disadvantage that can be elim-
inated in further procedure, as some opposition parties have expressed their readiness to cooperate on the
projects’ evaluation in the sphere of media and education. 
What are the possible follow-up actions concerning the submitted proposal? One of the possibilities is
the formation of a joint working group within the Working Table II, so as to examine and report on the sub-
mitted proposal. Discussions will be held primarily among experts. After submitting the report to Working
Table II a decision on the next step will be taken. Of course, it depends on the assessment of the submitted
proposal’s validity and a political decision about follow-up actions. As we understood, that was what Mr.
Bodo Hombach, the Stability Pact Special Coordinator has decided to do. 
The other possibility, which does not exclude the first one, is that the EU will establish a working group con-
sisting of its own and Serbian economists. It would have a broader task concerning all issues of the economic
situation in Serbia. The working group would submit a proposal to the EU on the specific assistance to the future
democratic government in Serbia. This could be a completely anticipated step as the EU has already expressed
its intention to support financially the integration of democratic Serbia into its political and economic institutions.
Relative to the essence of the proposal, there are also two options. One is to proceed with talks on a
post-Milosevic funding conference. This type of conference is also called a "Virtual Donors’ conference". The
second option is to initiate real preparations for a preparatory donors’ Conference". Potential donors and
investors would not "sign the checks" in advance for the chosen projects, but rather they would examine in
detail the submitted proposals and select those intended for support. Each of the selected projects presumes
a certain financial support and time for realization. After free and fair elections are held in Serbia and a
reformist government is formed, the real donors’ conference could be held in the shortest possible term.
The experience of the conference in Brussels and the events afterwards should be used in this case as
well. That conference could be briefly presented as follows:
Political support => Finance => Project evaluation => Implementation
Some "quick start" projects were not realized so quickly but will be initiated in the next 12 months. The
reason is that they were not completed at the moment of adoption, so they could not be realized immedi-
ately. In the case of Serbia, the technical evaluation of projects should start immediately so as to save time.
Therefore, the sequence of steps could be as follows:
Political support => Projects evaluation => Finance => Implementation
Given the potential danger of social turmoil after the change of regime in Serbia, it is very important
that the intended international support comes in time. Thus, preparatory work for such support should
begin as soon as possible. 
Elections as 
a referendum
Joint working
group
Virtual donors’ 
conference
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The Stability Pact
is Key
Financial Needs for Macroeconomic Reforms
and the Reconstruction of Serbia
Macroeconomic reforms and the reconstruction of Serbia contributing to its return into the international
community are difficult tasks which a newly elected democratic government will be unable to accomplish
unless it obtains strong domestic and international support as early as in the first month of its mandate. In
order to secure an increased living standard of the population on a permanent basis and to justify the great
expectations of citizens after the change of authoritarian regime, the new government will have to start
immediately with radical economic reforms. This presumes primarily a monetary reform, the initiation of
fiscal reform and the realization of a program of swift privatization, with a significant increase in the level
of education, health-care and social security for the population. 
Taking into account the horrendous economic and social consequences of the former Yugoslavia’s dis-
integration, civil war, and the ill-conducted economic policy of the current regime, as well as international
sanctions, the country’s isolation and NATO bombing campaign it is quite obvious that the new government
would be unable to finance alone the conduct of economic reforms and the reconstruction of domestic infra-
structure, even if it succeeds in engaging all available resources. On the other hand, even under the most
favorable conditions, the renewal of Serbian membership in international financial institutions (the IMF, the
World Bank), and a solution to the issue of succession with former Yugoslav republics would take several
months, which is enough for the new government to lose its credibility and face serious social dissatisfaction
among its citizens. This would impede its activities and could result in public calls for the abandonment of
reforms. The new government, therefore, has to have a relevant foreign assistance at its disposal in the very
beginning of its mandate. Such assistance could be secured only by donations within the Stability Pact for
SouthEast Europe. Part of the assistance would be earmarked to a fund for macroeconomic stabilization,
while the rest would be invested into the reconstruction and modernization of infrastructure.
I. Financial Assistance for Macroeconomic Stabilization
Coverage from real sources of public sector deficits in Serbia during the first year of the new demo-
cratic government would ensure:
¥ non-inflationary financing of public expenditures and macroeconomic stability of the economy,
¥ positive impact on economic growth,
¥ reform of the whole fiscal system and, in particular, the introduction of transparent mechanisms for
collecting fiscal revenues and public spending.
Meanwhile, this would imply definite international community support to the new democratic gov-
ernment and its orientation towards political and economic reforms in the country.
Financing
The public deficit in 2001 is forecasted to be USD 942 million, accounting for 6,9% of the NMP. This
deficit could be partially financed from domestic resources. On the basis of the quick sale of parts of
domestic companies (state and socially owned) currently undergoing privatization it would be possible to
collect around USD 350 million. The remaining USD 600 million should be financed from external sources.
As the country’s credit worthiness will be
low, it is unlikely that more than USD 100
million can be obtained on the European
capital market. Around half a billion dollars
should be collected through the Fund for
macroeconomic stabilization, which would
be formed within the Stability Pact for
SouthEast Europe.
Stabilization of domestic currency
Finances for the Fund for macroeconomic stabilization would be employed to bridge budgetary gaps,
but also for domestic currency stabilization. The Fund’s revenues would be used for the increase of for-
eign currency reserves held by the National Bank of Yugoslavia, on the basis of which it would be possi-
ble to issue a new domestic convertible currency, by adopting some of the floating rate modalities. For a
sustainable backing of the exchange rate, a relatively modest level of foreign currency reserves would be
required in the beginning, despite the fact that real money supply (M1) only stood at around USD 330 mil-
lion in the middle of 2000. It should be taken into account that an important part of financial transactions
in Serbia is being conducted in the zone of the shadow economy (at least 50%) and that its share would
be gradually integrated into the formal sector, through the conduct of fiscal reforms. This will additionally
increase official reserves. 
Suspension of off-budget revenues and expenditures
The introduction of off-budget revenues coincides with the reduction of the registered fiscal deficit.
Hence, there is a reasonable doubt that the existence of off-budget revenues and expenditures raises the
real public deficit, the scope of which has, officially, been declining over the last three years from 12.8%
to 9.1% of NMP. In 2001, fiscal transparency will be introduced. All off-budget payments will be suspend-
ed, while off-budget revenues will be included in the budget. This will result in a reduction of the regis-
tered fiscal deficit to 6.9% in 2001.
In the previous years, a quasi-fiscal deficit (losses of public enterprises) accounted for between a
half and two-thirds of the total deficit. In 2001, we anticipate price liberalization, privatization and the
beginning of public enterprisesÕ restructuring. The quasi-fiscal deficit will be drastically reduced (even
perhaps completely annulled), but, consequently, part of the budget assets intended for social protec-
tion and unemployment benefits, i.e. re-qualification and productive employment of labor surplus
would have to be increased. This will result in upward pressure on budgetary deficits in the medium-
term. 
Structural reforms
will bring fiscal
transparency and
budget deficits
Immediate financial 
assistance
Financial sources Amounts in million dollars
Privatization proceeds 350
Short-term credits 100
Stability PactÕs Fund for macroeconomic stabilization 500
Financial Assistance for Macroeconomic Stabilization
Military and police
expenditures 
will fall
Relative to 1997, fiscal revenues would be reduced by 1.5%, while fiscal expenditures would fall by
1% of NMP. Nevertheless, they will still remain high, accounting for 53% and 59.9% of NMP respectively.
A further decrease of their share of NMP is possible only with faster economic growth.
Demilitarization
Military expenses will be reduced from the present 7% to 5% of NMP. This was the limit determined
by law, even before the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. Further estimates of military expenditures will
depend on the country’s defense strategy, which the new Parliament must adopt. Police expenditures will
be drastically scaled down to 1.3% of NMP, as a reduction of police forces and the removal of the reasons
for its "special purposes" (due to which such expenditures have significantly grown in the last two years)
are also envisaged.
Social expenditures
Pension expenditures are the largest problem of public financing. Reduction in their share of NMP by
one percent of its three-year average is predicted. This would provide for a modest pension increase rel-
ative to those paid in 1999, but it would still remain below the level of 1997. Further reduction of expen-
ditures for pensions is related to a serious pension system reform.
Education and health care expenditures would be returned to the level of 1997, meaning that economic
growth would require an increase in the share of education expenses by at least a half percent of NMP.
Expenditures for social safety and the labor market will be increased by one and two percent of NMP
respectively due to demilitarization needs, employment, and re-qualification of redundancies resulting from
the restructuring of public enterprises and the liberalization of their prices.
The introduction of an independent judiciary and anti-corruption struggle require an increase of expen-
ditures to support the legal state. Due to the limited maneuvering space, an increase of these expenditures
by only one per cent of NMP is predicted. 
External debt servicing
In 2001, the beginning of regular external debt servicing is predicted. If commitments for external debt
servicing from the Memorandum signed with the London Club of Creditors in 1998 and legal commitments
on citizens’ frozen foreign currency savings were undertaken, budgetary obligation on these bases would
account for 1.2% of NMP.
Privatization proceeds
In 2001, it would not be realistic to expect a quick inflow of foreign capital on the basis of privatiza-
tion of domestic enterprises. Maximal proceeds of USD 350 million could be expected. Candidates for
quick privatization are cement and tobacco factories, Yugoslav Airlines, the oil refinery in Novi Sad, a part
of the chemical industry, and distributional elements of the power utilities and the oil industry.
In the case of a lower NMP growth or adjustment of electricity prices over a longer period of time (for
example, within three years), the forecasted public deficit in 2001 could be much higher. On the other
hand, it is possible that revenues for covering the fiscal deficit are not realized as planned. For example,
it is possible that the sale of enterprises does not go as fast as expected or that the financial market does
not accept state securities in the planned scope. In that case, larger financial support for the stabilization
of the Serbian economy in the first year of the new democratic government should be considered. 
Speedy recovery of the economy
Following the conflict with NATO, we anticipate a speedy recovery of the economy that will significant-
ly mitigate the problem of public deficit. The expected growth rates of the NMP in this and the next year are
14% and 10% respectively. However, in 2001, the NMP will fail to reach the level it had in 1998. Therefore,
the low level of the NMP still presents the greatest obstacle for balancing public revenues and expenditures.
Public expenditures in Serbia1
1997 1998 1999 2001 1997 1998 1999 2001
In million dollars Shares in Net Material Product
Defense 853 771 754 679 6.2% 5.4% 7.0% 5.0%
Administration 212 211 180 204 1.5% 1.5% 1.7% 1.5%
Police 399 522 408 173 2.9% 3.6% 3.8% 1.3%
Judiciary 127 100 78 272 0.9% 0.7% 0.7% 2.0%
Education 812 604 478 883 5.9% 4.2% 4.4% 6.5%
Social Protection 306 357 220 408 2.2% 2.5% 2.0% 3.0%
Investment 142 135 102 136 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 1.0%
Pension 2,661 2,722 2,018 2,446 19.3% 19.0% 18.6% 18.0%
Health Care 1,400 1,164 978 1,359 10.2% 8.1% 9.0% 10.0%
Labor Market 97 95 80 340 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 2.5%
Local Governments 799 843 620 815 5.8% 5.9% 5.7% 6.0%
Debt Service 158 1.2%
Others 567 424 328 272 4.1% 3.0% 3.0% 2.0%
Total Expenditures 8,375 7,948 6,244 8,144 60.9% 55.6% 57.6% 59.9%
Total Revenues 7,493 7,444 5,940 7,201 54.5% 52.0% 54.8% 53.0%
Deficit -882 -504 -304 -942 -6.4% -3.6% -2.8% -6.9%
Net Material Product 13,758 14,304 10,835 13,587 
1 The Republic of Serbia without Kosovo
Estimates of the Fiscal Deficit 
Social expenditures
will rise
Targeted quick 
privatization would
ease some of the
burden
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Domestic financing
will not be 
sufficient
II. Reconstruction and Modernization of Infrastructure
For over two decades the macroeconomic development of Serbia has not favored investments in
infrastructure. In the 1980’s, NMP stagnation produced delay and, in some cases,  abandonment of
needed infrastructure projects. In the 1990’s, a deep-rooted economic crisis in Serbia placed infra-
structure in a very hard position. There were no new infrastructure projects and the existing infra-
structure systems were not properly maintained. The overall situation was aggravated with the phys-
ical destruction of elements of infrastructure in the spring of 1999, as a result of the NATO campaign. 
Investments in Serbia’s infrastructure are a necessary component of its future development. The
projects we presented are part of the complex studies of urban rehabilitation of Serbian towns, which
will prepare a basis for the necessary conversion of industry to a higher stage of urban development
(the stage of regional towns). 
Types of  infrastructure projects
There are three types of infrastructure projects:
(1) projects of national importance (investments into the international road and railroad network,
reconstruction of bridges, revitalization of the power industry, reconstruction of the main oil
and gas pipelines network);
(2) projects of regional importance (clearance and maintenance of waterways /the Danube/; flood
prevention; rehabilitation of irrigation and drainage channels in Vojvodina; reconstruction of
the Rzav accumulation /water supply/);
(3) projects of local importance (investments into vital infrastructure projects in 13 Serbian munic-
ipalities).
Financing
Finances required
for the realization of
infrastructure projects
of national, regional
and local importance
amount to around USD
6.8 billion. This sum is
the product of prelimi-
nary assessments of
needs for investments
into Serbia’s infrastruc-
ture. Depending on
investment areas, the
needs refer to the peri-
od between 3 years
(power industry) and
10 years (traffic). Fi-
nancing of the large
infrastructure projects
from domestic resources will not be possible given the poor economic situation of the country. Thus,
in the very beginning of economic reforms, the majority of funds needed for the infrastructure financ-
ing should be secured through donations or loans by European banks, primarily the European
Investment Bank. In a later stage, infrastructure projects would be financed from foreign direct invest-
ments and concessions. 
Stages
The large scope of investments in infrastructure and the relatively long period for their realiza-
tion requires that the investments be divided into relevant time stages. In the first year of the new
government’s mandate, the realization of quick start projects would begin: reconstruction of main
roads on Corridor X, rehabilitation of destroyed power capacities, and reconstruction of new facili-
ties in the transmission network and open cast mines, clearance of the Danube, revitalization of the
Dunav-Tisa-Dunav irrigation channels and realization of the urban infrastructure projects at the local
level.
Mutual Interests
SouthEast Europe is away from the main European markets and presents a European periphery in
economic terms. Investments in Serbia’s infrastructure, particularly in significant transport corridors,
would enable mutual connections with the countries in the region and connections with the markets
of developed European countries and MiddleEast countries. Energy infrastructure would gain charac-
teristics of a regional market (power industry) or would become important for oil and gas transit.
Infrastructure development would provide stabilization of the entire region, thus making it a signifi-
cant market for European manufacturers. 
Completion of a traffic network, particularly the Corridor X, would provide for a significant
increase of foreign currency revenues. Given that Serbia will have serious difficulties to finance its
external debt in the years to come, this inflow of hard currencies will have substantial positive effects
on the balance of payments and the whole development of the country.
Due to the nature of infrastructure, donations, loans, concessions and FDI in this area will have
long-term effects in Serbia. These effects have at least two features. The new infrastructure facilities
built from international sources will be in operation for a number of years, thus remaining as a cor-
ner stone for future development. Also, services from these facilities will be available in the long-term
and a large number of people will benefit from them. The donations, loans, concessions and FDI
would serve not only the present generation and immediate purposes, but also future generations and
the needs of Serbia and regional countries.
Investment Requirements and 
Financial Sources
Amounts Quick Second Donation (D),
Projects (USD mil.) start stage Loan (L), FDI,
Concession (C)
Main roads 3,113 200 2,913 D, L, C
Railroads 600 30 570 D, L
Power Industry 2,133 231 1,902 D, L, FDI 
Gas pipelines 350 50 300 L, FDI 
Oil pipelines 35 35 L, FDI
Regional projects 524 67 457 D, L
Local projects 57 57 D,C
Total 6,812 635 6,177
Two decades 
of decay
The entire region
benefits
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MACROECONOMIC REVIEW
Living costs in Serbia rose by 5.5% ¥ Industrial production rose by 3.2% ¥ Does the multiplier
function? ¥ The next monthsÕ open monetary policy issues
Prices
The month of May in Serbia recorded
retail price growth of 4.5%, and 11.6% in
Montenegro. It is evident that the change of
the foreign currency exchange rate in
accounting imported consumer goods has
not yet fully reflected upon retail prices, its
effect remains to be seen in the months to
come. The items recording the largest price
growth were: personal hygiene up by 7.7%,
fresh fruit up by 16.9%, and fresh vegetables
up by 21.1%.  
According to official statistics, since the
beginning of the year prices in Serbia rose by
13.1%, and by 31.8% in Montenegro.  
The cost of living in Serbia was up 5.5%
in the month of May, slightly more than the
growth of retail prices, while in Montenegro
the cost of living rose by 10.0%, somewhat
less than retail price growth. 
The larger growth of producer prices in
May relative to April announces larger retail
price growth in June.  The largest growth (at
FRY level) was recorded in construction
material production - as much as 87.8%.
Industrial production
Industrial production in the FRY increased by 3.2% in May month-on-month.  In Montenegro, pro-
duction fell by 15.5%, while in Serbia it rose by 4.3%.  Production growth in central Serbia amounted
to 2.3%, and 9.1% in Vojvodina.  Production fell in ten fields - ranging from 0.7% (production of traf-
fic means) to 34.5% (shipbuilding), while it increased in all other fields, ranging from 0.2% (electric
machine and appliances’ production) to 43.4% (oil derivatives’ production).  The deseasoned index
for May shows a rise relative to April of 0.7%, meaning that production remained practically on the
same level.
In May industrial production in FRY was up 962% year on year.  The same seasonal factors were at
work then, but so were the NATO bombing forces, so that such large growth resulted primarily from
the very low base from which it was calculated.  Industrial production in Montenegro was up by 4.6%
year on year, and up by 106.8% year on year in Serbia.  Industrial production increased by 101.8% and
118.8% year on year in Central Serbia and Vojvodina, respectively.  
Industrial production in FRY during the first five months of year 2000 grew by 14.9% relative to the
same period last year. In this case the figures show real production growth.  However, similar to the
case of the index for May 2000 to May 1999,
growth figures result from last year’s low
base.  A fall of 0.6% was recorded in
Montenegro, while there was growth of
16.4% in Serbia.  Production in central Serbia
increased by 19.5%, and 9.6% in Vojvodina.  
The country’s reconstruction started off
with a conviction that the multiplier will
function and lead to a significant increase in
GDP.  The multiplier effect exists, but to a
lesser degree than anticipated.  In the previ-
ous month, Group 17 tried to evaluate the
total of reconstructed facilities.  A document
entitled "Serbia 2000" operated with a figure
of 191.3 million USD.  It appears that official
statistical data on production trends speak in
favor of this estimate, especially in fields
related to reconstruction, as well as civil
engineering trends.  It is interesting to note
that levels recorded in the mentioned indus-
tries, or sectors, are lesser than levels
achieved in 1998, which is not in compli-
ance with the general image of reconstruc-
tion.  If we took notice of the import of
goods needed for reconstruction works, we
would see, for example, that only a few of
them are among the first one hundred items,
which is logical with regard to displayed
import tendencies. 
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The fact that industrial production in the FRY was 70.0% less in May 2000 as compared to May 1989
is a logical consequence, just as it was 69.8% lesser in the January - May 2000 period relative to the
same period in 1989.  
Recently announced poor agricultural yields, combined with insufficiently recovered industrial pro-
duction, will require corrections of the GDP estimate in the coming months.    
Foreign trade and the foreign currency exchange rate
Although it is still early to speak of the effects of measures taken in the previous month, the impres-
sion emerges that the prognosis stated in the last issue of the Economic Review was accurate.  The
graph illustrates very well one of the key problems - the unfavorable structure of import as a direct
consequence of an inadequate foreign trade policy.  The second problem is, certainly, the exceeding-
ly low level of export.  In the first five months of this year exports from Serbia fell by 0.3% relative to
the same period last year.  In the same period imports increased by 37.1%, generating a January to May
trade deficit of 843.4 million USD.  Expectations of significant improvements in the situation and an
increase of export revenue are unrealistic, where restrictions from abroad are viewed as a fundamen-
tal cause.
The most apparent effect is the mainte-
nance of stability in the foreign currency
market during the past month.  Stability rep-
resents, in the greatest extent, a reflection of
decreased demand for foreign currency as
influenced by decreased import.  
There is a noticeable import of merchan-
dise by "privileged" importers that have now
been classified into May and former months
as a result of the customs’ rate increase - the
goods were taxed before the increase
although they were being imported since the
beginning of the year.  This happened with
natural gas whose import in March and April
amounted to 70 million USD, and crude oil in
the amount of 21 million USD.  
In Montenegro exports rose in January to
May by 36.1% relative to the same period last
year, while imports fell by 14% and the for-
eign trade deficit reached 74 million USD.
The considerable fall in comparison to April
is a consequence of a subsequent inclusion of
goods transported by sea, i.e. the true figure
for May will be known at the beginning of
July.  Half of Montenegrin imports come from
European Union countries, and they mostly
consist of fuel, food, telecommunication
appliances, etc.  On the other hand, the rela-
tive fall of exports from Serbia to Montenegro
continues.
Monetary policy
According to Yugoslav Banking Association data, in the period from June 5th-29th around 15% of
obligations, or around 25 million DEM, were settled from a total amount of 183 million DEM that must
be settled in the course of this year.  Thus, annual obligations towards around 170,000 savings accounts
have been regulated.  Clients face three options: they can wait for foreign currency, receive dinar pay-
ments by the "stimulative" exchange rate, or accept gold.  
How realistic is the promise of paying off
deposits in foreign currency?  It is realistic to
expect up to 75 million DEM until the end of
the year from export proceeds.  Another 25-
30 million could be settled by gold coins.
According to this optimistic prognosis, 100-
110 million DEM in obligations would be reg-
ulated in this way.  The remaining fifty mil-
lion DEM or one billion dinars will need to be
financed in another way.      
Under these circumstances the issue arises
over the kind of monetary policy that the
National Bank of Yugoslavia will undertake.
In the period ahead of us an expansive mon-
etary policy would somewhat contribute to
larger growth rates.  On the other hand, hav-
ing in mind repressed inflation and outstand-
ing inflationary expectations, the risk would
be too high.  The buying up of agricultural
items and the mentioned portion of foreign
currency deposits, as well as the forthcoming
elections, represent additional pressure, where
the NBY itself has problems with monetary
policy instruments - the real discount rate is
negative, along with the existing problem of
utilizing the reserves of commercial banks.
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